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Modelling Maritime Trade Systems: Agent-Based 
Simulation and Medieval History 
Ulf Christian Ewert & Marco Sunder ∗ 
Abstract: »Mittelalterlicher Seehandel im Modell - eine Anwendung agenten-
basierter Simulation in der Mediävistik.« Maritime trade grew enormously in 
Europe after c. 1100 AD, thereby contributing much to the European economic 
take-off commonly considered as the “Commercial Revolution of the Middle 
Ages.” In this article, determinants of both the formation of the Hanse’s network-
based system of trade in Northern Europe and its later dissolution are analysed 
using a multi-agent model. Findings are connected to the discussion in institu-
tional economics and economic history concerning the importance of institu-
tional developments in long-distance trade for economic growth in medieval 
Europe, the efficiency of self-enforcing institutions, and the divergence of in-
stitutional arrangements in medieval maritime trade. Finally, both potentials 
and limitations of agent-based models for historical research are discussed. 
Keywords: Commercial revolution, medieval maritime trade, multi-agent models, 
network organisation, Hanse. 
1.  The Rise (and Fall) of Medieval Trading Systems  
1.1  The Commercial Revolution and Institutional Arrangements in 
Medieval Trade 
After c. 1100 AD, Europe saw an unprecedented economic take-off with huge 
demographic and social dynamics unfolding all across the continent. A con-
stant increase in population, a huge expansion of arable land, the foundation of 
hundreds of towns and a sustained economic growth resulting from all this 
formed the background of what certainly has to be considered not only an 
economic take-off, but also a significant societal change. A concomitant of this 
process was the re-establishment of long-distance trade, an issue that, following 
the seminal analysis of Robert S. Lopez, is commonly referred to as the 
“Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages” (Lopez 1976 [1971]; Epstein 
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2009). At first, such a general economic take-off can be observed in Western 
Europe and in the Mediterranean in the late eleventh and early twelfth centu-
ries, but it eventually spread over most of the continent and reached also 
Northern Europe and the Baltic within the second half of the twelfth century. 
An important element of this “Commercial Revolution” was the enormous 
growth of maritime trade in some European regions, which allowed for a fur-
ther geographical specialisation of production and fostered European market 
integration – at least in part – through linking distant port towns. Coastal areas 
thus developed faster than inland regions – in the Mediterranean as well as in 
the Baltic. Compared with overland trade, maritime trade for long seems to 
have been a more important means to transfer commodities over long distances. 
At the periphery of Europe, in the Mediterranean, but also in the Baltic and in 
the North Sea, commercial exchange via the open sea was inevitable, of course. 
However, the introduction of the re-designed magnetic compass in the Mediter-
ranean during the late thirteenth century triggered a further substantial rise in 
the rate of commercial exchange, because ships now were able to cross the 
open sea even during winter when traffic had rested before (Lane 1963). Fur-
thermore, before mid-fifteenth century political insecurity, warfare and an 
underdeveloped and insufficient infrastructure of overland transportation made 
maritime trade more attractive even in regions of Europe were long-distance 
trade, to some extent at least, was already operated overland. Sea transportation 
often was simply faster than overland transportation, even though it always was 
risky and dangerous due to bad weather and piracy (Munro 2001). A good 
example for this is certainly the establishment of a regular galley service be-
tween Venice and Bruges in the late thirteenth century and its maintenance well 
into the fifteenth century. 
The institutional economics literature concerning the economic history of 
Europe recurrently points to the fact that institutions had a formative impact on 
Europe’s economic take-off during the Middle Ages (North 1981, 1990, 1991). 
Institutions can be designed in such a way that they are able to either enhance 
or to spoil personal and impersonal exchange, depending on whether the insti-
tutional design allows traders to reduce transaction costs in a significant man-
ner, or instead increases these costs (North 1985). As over the course of time 
the majority of medieval merchants became more or less sedentary, which in 
turn made impersonal exchange more important, especially the invention and 
implementation of institutions capable of enforcing the merchants’ property 
rights abroad is believed to have enhanced the huge expansion of commerce in 
medieval Europe (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; North 1991, 1993; 
Greif 1997, 2000, 2002b, 2006; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). 
Nevertheless, paths of institutional development obviously were different 
across Europe. Regions in which large systems of long-distance trade devel-
oped during the high Middle Ages were the Mediterranean, Western Europe, 
and the Baltic. Whereas the Western European system around its core of the 
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Fairs of Champagne (Bautier 1953; Berlow 1971; Thomas 1977; Schönfelder 
1988) was characterised by overland trade, the two other systems were essen-
tially maritime in character. Interestingly enough, these systems of long-
distance maritime trade differed substantially with respect to structure and 
performance. While a primarily law-based trade system emerged rather early in 
both Western Europe and the Mediterranean, providing merchants – who pre-
dominantly were of Italian origin – with formal institutions, a kinship-based 
network structure persisted in Northern Europe among the merchants of the 
Hanse, who basically relied on informal and self-enforcing institutions (Ewert 
and Selzer 2016). This observation points to a current debate on whether either 
the clever design of self-enforcing institutions – a hypothesis advocated by 
Avner Greif (Greif 1989, 1992, 1993, 2000) – or the establishment of law-
based institutions – as Sheilagh C. Ogilvie and Jeremy Edwards argue (Ogilvie 
2007; Edwards and Ogilvie 2011, 2012) – finally caused the rise of long-
distance trade and the immense growth of medieval commerce. 
1.2   Network Characteristics of Hanseatic Long-Distance Trade 
Medieval Northern European trade was dominated by merchants from Lower 
Germany and the Baltic – the so-called Hansards. Based upon the privileges 
they had been granted in London, Novgorod, Bruges, and Bergen, they founded 
trading outlets (Kontore) in these important markets (von Brandt 1963; Doll-
inger 1964; Bracker 1989). The Hanse, like the entire merchant community 
was named, monopolised commercial exchange in the North Sea and the Baltic 
until the turn of the sixteenth century. While during the “Commercial Revolu-
tion” merchants elsewhere in Europe began to deploy sophisticated techniques, 
formal contractual schemes and complex organisation patterns to handle risk 
capital, operate cashless payments and transmit market information quickly via 
huge distances (Lopez 1976 [1971]; Epstein 2009), many of such techniques 
either were only poorly developed or even missing in Northern Europe. Even in 
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Hansards, each of whom usually 
had only a small amount of capital at hand, traded still mainly with each other, 
and they did this on the basis of mostly informal, only implicitly defined con-
tracts (Selzer and Ewert 2001; Ewert and Selzer 2007, 2010). These trading 
networks of different size and varying density (Selzer and Ewert 2001; Ewert 
and Selzer 2007, 2015) were medium-term or long-term cooperations of legally 
independent merchants, being primarily based on kinship and friendship 
(Sprandel 1984; Stark 1993). Information on network structure can be drawn 
only for the late medieval period from different types of sources – account 
books, letters, and wills (Ewert and Selzer 2015, 2016), for example. A mer-
chant could have up to c. 40 trading partners in a period of about 30 years, and 
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cooperation with a single partner could last up to 22 years.1 Mutual relation-
ships between Hansards and their social proximity to each other can also be 
grasped from their joint membership in town councils, merchant societies, and 
merchant associations (Dünnebeil 1996; Selzer 1996; Asmussen 2002; 
Burkhardt 2009), their nearby lodging in the Hanse towns (Hammel 1985; Igel 
2005) and their mutual choice of one another as future executors of their wills 
(Meyer 2002, 2005, 2010).2 
The core structure of networks typically consisted of mutual transactions be-
tween two partners at distant locations, each partner selling the other partner’s 
goods. Such commercial cooperations neither needed formal contracting nor 
have they been exclusive, and a selling merchant was usually not paid by the 
sending merchant for taking the commercial risk entailed with the sale. This 
sort of reciprocal trade was by far the most important pattern of commercial 
exchange between Hansards (Mickwitz 1937, 1938; Sprandel 1984; Stark 
1993; Cordes 1998, 2000).3 Core partnerships – i.e. stable and persistent ex-
change relationships showing a high frequency of mutual exchange – are 
thought to coincide significantly with family ties (Koppe 1933; Cordes 1998). 
An instructive example of such a kinship network is the Veckinchusen family. 
From Bruges, where he lived at the beginning of the fifteenth century, Hilde-
brand Veckinchusen traded regularly – on the basis of reciprocal exchange – 
with his brothers, his cousins, his father-in-law, his nephews, and some of his 
friends in Lübeck, Danzig, Riga, Reval, and Dorpat (Irsigler 1985; Stark 1993; 
Cordes 1998; Greve 2002; Selzer 2010; Ewert and Selzer 2015, 2016). Togeth-
er with his brother Sivert he also was member of a formal company through 
which he operated his trade with Cologne (Schweichel 2002). 
Yet, the Hanse’s network organisation of trade was more than just a simple 
overlap of family and business circles. The pattern that had evolved through the 
trading activities of the Hansards is quite typical for a network organisation 
(Selzer and Ewert 2001, 2005, 2010; Ewert and Selzer 2007, 2010, 2016). Such 
an organisation is defined as a loose cooperation of legally and economically 
independent entities. Through “networking” a “new” structure evolves which 
constitutes the framework for potential cooperations between the members of a 
network. In theory, such an inter-organisational network has no hierarchy. 
                                                             
1 This is derived from account books that are preserved for the merchants Johann Pisz (Pyre) 
from Danzig, Vicko von Geldersen from Hamburg, and Hermann and Johann Wittenborg 
from Lübeck. The account book of Johann Pisz (Pyre) covers a period of about 32 years. 
2 Networks of Hansards involved in the trade with Bergen, for example, are documented in 
Burkhardt (2009, 2012). 
3 There also existed the sendeve, a kind of commission business. In this well-defined contrac-
tual scheme the commission agent sold the goods he had received from another merchant 
by order and for account of the partner who had formally instructed the sale and had sent 
the goods to the commission agent, with profits and risk remaining with the sender (Cordes 
1998, 1999). 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  114 
Hence, cooperations between network members may be thought of as voluntary 
and flexible couplings (Powell 1990; Illinitch, D’Aveni and Levin 1996; Os-
born and Hagedoorn 1997; Windeler 2001). In the Hanse case small-scale 
businesses of self-employed merchants with only little financial power each 
formed such networks by mutually cooperating in reciprocal trade. Commercial 
exchange was coordinated by culture, trust, and reputation.4 Belonging to a 
broader family, sharing common values and speaking the same language facili-
tated exchange between Hansards considerably. Outside families cultural cor-
respondence between network members was established and maintained by 
institutions and social events that allowed network members to socialise with 
each other. The “King Arthur’s courts” (Artushöfe) in the Baltic (Selzer 1996) 
or the “Society of the circle” (Zirkel-Gesellschaft) of Lübeck (Dünnebeil 1996) 
are good examples of such institutions where merchants and political leaders of 
the local town met guests from other towns, celebrated festivities, and ex-
changed all kinds of commercial information. These institutions were also 
important for the enforcement of fairness within commercial networks, since 
they allowed information on the reputation of individual network members to 
be distributed across the entire network (Selzer 2003). Not to lose good reputa-
tion was the primary incentive of network members to act fairly, as cheating 
not only destroyed the relationship with the betrayed partner but also resulted 
in a loss of access to the whole network and thus undermined other possible 
partnerships in the future. While commercial information would have had to be 
transmitted quickly to control particular trade operations – which was almost 
impossible given the information technology of the time – for the transmission 
of information on reputation slower channels were sufficient to prevent fraud 
among merchants. The kinship- and friendship-based network provided its 
members with a certain degree of flexibility at only moderate costs of transac-
tion, information, and organisation and it always offered opportunities to estab-
lish commercial contacts inside the broader community of Hansards (Ewert and 
Selzer 2015, 2016). 
1.3   Focus and Structure of the Paper 
Why did institutional arrangements of trade develop so differently? And what 
made arrangements to develop in either one or another way? The focus of this 
article is therefore laid upon determinants that potentially shaped specific pat-
terns of medieval long-distance trade, in particular those of maritime trade. 
In general, the aim is at modelling commercial exchange with an agent-
based model that captures some of the relevant features of medieval maritime 
trade, such as the geographic spread of resources, distance-based transportation 
                                                             
4 Such means of coordination are often assumed to compensate for a missing hierarchy 
(Powell 1990; Galaskiewicz 1996; Staber 2000). 
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costs, trade privileges, and information asymmetries. The model and its setup 
will be described in more detail in the subsequent Section 2 of this paper. 
More specifically, simulation runs of this model are used to analyse tenta-
tively emergence, formation, and later dissolution of the Hanse’s network-
based system of trade, by which Hanseatic merchants were capable of more or 
less monopolising trade in the Baltic and the North Sea until the late fifteenth 
century. One objective is to illustrate possible paths of the emergence of a 
network pattern in medieval long-distance trade that – as is the case of Hanse-
atic commerce – can only be traced in the surviving historical records of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, long time after the network had been formed. 
Findings and interpretation are presented in Section 3. 
Based upon these findings, and taking Hanseatic commerce also as a case 
study, a tentative interpretation of why the institutional arrangement of mari-
time trade in the Mediterranean might have developed in a different way will 
then be given in the closing Section 4, along with some thoughts about the 
feasibility of modelling and simulation approaches to (medieval) history in 
general. 
2. A Multi-Agent Model of Medieval Maritime Trade 
2.1  Modelling Prerequisites and General Setup of the Model 
First of all, a simulation model of medieval maritime trade is defined. Its 
design captures some of the features considered to be fundamental in medieval 
maritime trade – a geographic spread of resources, transportation costs 
increasing with distance, trade privileges, and information asymmetries. The 
model consists of a square world in which 64 towns arranged akin to the fields 
of a chessboard. Each town has an initial population of n = 1,000, and two 
goods can be produced in or around the town: foodstuffs (F) and manufactured 
goods (C).5 Among the citizens of each town an equal distribution of wealth is 
assumed, and a town’s welfare is defined as 
ܹ = √ܨ ∙ ܥ/݊	. 
A limited amount of both goods is produced and consumed autonomously by 
the population in each town, irrespective of population size. This amount is set 
to 30 for both types of goods. Larger amounts may become available if there is 
a merchant in the town. While total population is fixed in the model, towns 
with higher welfare attract population from neighbouring towns. However, 
only a small fraction (c. 5 per cent) of the entire welfare-equalising migration 
                                                             
5 A typical manufactured good in the Middle Ages that was traded across Europe were tex-
tiles and cloth. So, C here stands for cloth. 
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occurs within a period to ensure that larger towns may withstand even short 
periods of decreasing welfare. Migration takes place only at the end of each 
period of the simulation, after both production and trade of commodities have 
been completed (see Figure 1 below). 
2.2   The Production of Goods and Trading Activities of Merchants 
Merchants are the agents of the model. To keep things simple, by assumption 
no more than one merchant can settle in a particular town. Settlement requires 
the payment of a lump sum tax, which is subtracted from the merchant’s wealth 
in each period. This tax is set to 500 units within the simulation. Merchants can 
increase their wealth by selling commodities to the local population and/or by 
engaging in long-distance trade with other merchant towns. Each merchant 
trades with one of the two goods, according to the specialisation of his home 
town. How much is produced in each period is a function of the local popula-
tion size 
௜ܺ
௣௥௢ௗ. = ௜ܵ	 ∙ ݊ఉ		, 
with 		 ௜ܺ ∈ 	 ሼܨ௣௥௢ௗ., ܥ௣௥௢ௗ.ሽ. The dichotomous variable Si takes on the value 1 
in the case foodstuffs are produced (or manufactured goods) in a town with a 
specialisation in foodstuffs (or manufactured goods) and the value 0 otherwise. 
In all simulations β is set to 0.6, thereby assuming diminishing returns to town 
size. After production, the merchant may sell the town’s produce locally and/or 
engage in long-distance trade with other merchants in distant towns. For the 
latter purpose, each merchant is in possession of one ship on which he can 
carry a limited amount of the good that is produced in his home town. This 
capacity limit is set to 30 units of one of the two goods in all simulations. Sell-
ing the produce locally means both selling it to the local population and to 
other merchants whose ships may have arrived in the local port. No trade is 
possible with towns that do not have a merchant. 
A merchant’s decision whether or not to send his ship away and what cargo 
should be loaded for the travel to the distant town and/or the way back depends 
on the profit he is expecting of a trading voyage. To calculate expected profits 
opportunity costs are considered in the sense that the produce could also be 
sold at home. Every second stint of a trading voyage has to have the home town 
as its destination, so by assumption merchants in the model return immediately 
home in the next period, and they are not capable of solving travelling sales-
man problems that are more complex than a simple round-trip. Profit expecta-
tions depend on the beliefs about prices in all merchant towns, including the 
merchant’s home town. Each merchant has his own set of price beliefs for each 
of the towns. These beliefs depend both on his own experiences and on ru-
mours he had heard in the past. While price signals from distant towns are 
received with noise, those from his home town or the town where his ship is 
currently located are received without noise once all transactions of a period 
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have been settled. He also uses his price belief for his home town when decid-
ing upon his trading strategy. This implies that his strategy does not account for 
the cargo of ships sailing towards his home town. Furthermore, both expected 
and actual net-returns of a trading voyage depend on distance-based travelling 
costs and a fee that merchants of distant towns charge from the ships entering 
their harbours. Having completed a round-trip, ship owners update their beliefs 
about the net-returns for the respective destination town by calculating the 
difference between actually realised returns and those originally expected. Such 
deviations from the original plan may arise, for example, from limitations of 
supply in the town of destination. 
The price a merchant believes to realise in his home town is assumed to 
equal the price he charges other merchants when they purchase goods from him 
to load on their ship. The other party will always accept this price, without 
second thoughts. Ships that unload cargo sell their goods to the local popula-
tion – as does the local merchant if he sells his own produce at home. In this 
type of transaction, the price is a function of the entire quantity supplied in 
period t by autonomous production, incoming ships, and the local merchant. To 
avoid abrupt jumps in price volatility, an autoregressive component is intro-
duced, which gives 
݌௑೔,೟ = ߙ ∙ ݉/(2 ௜ܺ) + (1 − ߙ) ∙ ݌௑೔,೟షభ	 , 
where 	ܺ݅ ∈ ሼܨ, ܥሽ. The parameter m reflects the town’s long-run budget, which 
depends on the size of the population. Parameters are set to m = n and α = 0.5 
in all simulations. 
2.3   Merchant Demography and Kinship Networks of Trade 
Due to the lump sum tax or due to misconception about the net-returns from 
long-distance trade, a merchant’s wealth may become negative. In such a case 
of “bankruptcy” he disappears from the scene, thereby providing an “empty” 
town for a new merchant. Ships arriving at a town whose merchant has just 
disappeared will return to their home town and sell their cargo there. 
New merchants may come into being either by instantaneous creation or as 
an offshoot of an existing merchant. In both cases, the new merchant is 
equipped with an initial wealth of 1,000 units. Each period of the simulation in 
which there is at least one empty town with a specialisation in manufactured 
goods production sees the randomly chosen instantaneous creation of exactly 
one merchant in one of these empty towns. Such a merchant forms a new trade 
dynasty. His beliefs about the prices of goods in the various towns are vague – 
simply median prices plus some noise. Offshoots, in contrast, belong to the 
dynasty of their parent merchant, of whom they inherit their initial wealth (also 
1,000 units) and also adopt their initial beliefs about prices of commodities. 
Offshoots occur in an empty town nearby the parent, irrespective of the town’s 
specialisation. This sort of “birth” of new merchants forms the basis of trading 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  118 
networks in the model. Irrespective of wealth, a merchant disappears after his 
fifteeth period of existence. In this case, a nearby merchant of the same trade 
dynasty – if there is any – inherits the wealth. 
Apart from the possibility to inherit wealth, further potential advantages of 
belonging to a kinship-based commercial network are assumed: price signals 
from towns of the same network are received with a lower noise component, no 
fees are levied from ships sailing to a town whose merchant belongs to the 
same dynasty as the ship owner, and ships from the same dynasty as the local 
merchant are granted preferential access to buying cargo for their trip back 
home. 
All of the assumptions made are justified in a sense with historical evidence 
found for the period after 1300 AD regarding the trading practice of Hansards. 
Commercial assets were transferred to the next generation according to formal 
wills. Information on prices of commodities at different markets was shared 
among commercial partners at distant locations by sending each other letters. 
Information on other merchants’ reputation was exhanged within merchant 
societies and merchant associations. Hanseatic merchants sent their sons for 
apprenticeship to their relatives living in other towns. And in all of the Hanse 
towns trade with non-Hansards was firmly restricted or even prohibited by law 
(Ewert and Selzer 2016). 
2.4   Implementation of the Model 
An agent-based simulation approach is chosen here mainly for two reasons: 
firstly, in commercial exchange by definition more than one agent is involved, 
and single merchants only had limited access to the commercial information on 
which they could base their decision-making. As a consequence, it is necessary 
to allow for individual decisions, so that in the end a complex and observable 
macro-structure emerges such as the pattern of exchange resulting from various 
individual commercial activities of agents (merchants) at the micro-level 
(Doran 1996; Epstein and Axtell 1996). Secondly, geographic differences in 
the disposal of resources and in economic specialisation are important factors 
for trade and for the emergence of a trading system. Thus, different agents 
(merchants) are needed to represent this kind of economic variety. 
The multi-agent model defined above is implemented with NetLogo, version 
4.1.3 (Wilensky 1999). The flow-chart depicted in Figure 1 covers the various 
steps necessary to be computed in order to complete one period of the model. 
A round-trip (trading voyage) of a ship takes two periods in the model.6  
 
                                                             
6 When a ship is sailing back home with cargo, this cargo will only be unloaded in the third 
period. However, it can already load new cargo in the third period, which thus marks the 
beginning of the next round-trip. 
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Given the typical medieval maritime trade pattern, two periods roughly corre-
spond to a year, because sea merchants usually were able to complete a trading 
voyage to an overseas commercial destination within the same year. The analy-
sis of the model always starts with a town grid of equal population size and 
with no merchants. Half of the towns are specialised in manufacturing goods, 
the other half in producing foodstuffs. One “replication” of the simulation 
consists of running 600 periods of the model, which shall provide enough time 
for a particular pattern of trade to emerge and to develop. Different scenarios 
are set up by varying parameter settings. For each scenario 250 replications of 
these histories are run to obtain an understanding of the “typical” course of 
events and their distribution. The outcomes of different scenarios can then be 
compared with each other. 
3.  A Case Study: the Hanse’s Network Organisation of 
Trade 
3.1   Formation and Persistence of the Hansards’ Trading Networks 
Even though the Hanse’s network organisation of trade presumably was 
instrumental in bringing the “Commercial Revolution” to Northern Europe 
(Hammel-Kiesow 2000; Selzer 2010), its persistence until the end of the 
Middle Ages and beyond is nevertheless quite astonishing. Hansards delivered 
all sorts of goods to the consumers in the towns that had begun to flourish in 
the entire Baltic area (Selzer and Ewert 2001; Selzer 2010). They had crowded 
competitors out of long-distance trade in the North Sea and the Baltic, and in 
the process most of them became sedentary. During the late Middle Ages, 
Hanseatic merchants defended their major trade privileges successfully, and 
even though they had neither formed large firms nor adopted the – by that time – 
state-of-the-art trading techniques, they enjoyed a nearly perfect trade 
monopoly in the Baltic, at least until the late fifteenth century. How did this 
rather simple trading system evolve, which enabled Hansards to dominate 
Northern European trade so extensively? And why did it survive for such a 
long time? As only little information on specific merchants from the period 
before 1300 AD has survived, it is not clear how the closed kinship-based 
commercial networks – which are so typical for Hanseatic trade after 1300 AD 
– were built nor why they had been formed at all. In order to compensate for 
the scant data of the early period of Hanseatic trade, agent-based simulation 
appears to be a viable strategy to analyse these problems. 
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3.2  Simulation Results from a Baseline Scenario 
The presentation of simulation results first covers a scenario which is referred 
to as the “baseline scenario.” This scenario is calibrated in such a way as to 
reflect some conditions of Northern Europe in the eleventh to thirteenth 
centuries. The preset specialisation of towns follows an east-west pattern – 
manufactured goods specialisation is available in the western half of the map, 
foodstuffs in the east. Merchants, who trade in towns that do not belong to a 
merchant’s own family network, would have to pay a very high fee (of 350 
money units). This basically curtails all trade across dynasty boundaries. 
Furthermore, transportation costs are set to 40 money units per unit of distance, 
which seems high enough for geographic location of towns to be a relevant 
factor in the merchants’ trading strategies. 
The outcome of the simulation is measured in terms of a set of indicators 
that reflect the pattern of the trading system, economic development and 
welfare effects: The structure of the emerging trading system is measured in 
terms of the network density, defined as the ratio of all family ties to all ties 
possible, the dominance of the largest network, defined as the ratio of ties 
within the leading family network to the aggregate number of ties occurring in 
all other families,7 the persistence of leadership, defined as the propensity of 
the largest network in period t = 400 to hold this position also in period t = 600, 
and the median period of the first occurrence of a family network consisting of 
at least five merchants, a proxy for the speed of network formation.8 Economic 
development of the simulated world is captured in terms of the number of 
merchants, which is a proxy for commercial development, the share of ships 
sailing, which is a measure of the importance of long-distance maritime trade, 
and the number of merchants in towns with foodstuffs specialisation, indicating 
the expansion of trade into the rural eastern regions.9 A measure of welfare is 
the wealth of the leading network, indicating the economic success of a kinship 
network. It can also be seen as a proxy for the monopoly rent that can be 
earned.10 
                                                             
7 The “leading” family network is defined as the largest (in terms of head-count) group of 
merchants of the same dynasty. 
8 A further measure of structure is the population share associated with towns of the leading 
family network (Ewert and Sunder 2012). 
9 Again, additional indicators are measured, for example the concentration of population, 
calculated as the concentration ratio of the population shares for all towns which indicate 
how unevenly population is eventually distributed across the grid. If the entire population 
lived in a single town, the concentration ratio would assume the value 1, and it is 0 in the 
case of a perfectly even distribution across towns (Ewert and Sunder 2012). 
10 Alternative measures of welfare are the per period population-weighted welfare (of all 
towns) and the (cumulative) profit due to long-distance trade, indicating economic gains of 
sea trade since the very first period (Ewert and Sunder 2012). 
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Unless specified otherwise, the measures refer to the final period of each run 
(t = 600). As the model contains stochastic components – such as the initial 
placement of merchants or the noise in their price beliefs – outcomes of the 
simulation may not be deterministic. In Table 1 below means of the indicators 
for the baseline scenario on the basis of 250 replications are presented along 
with percentage deviations for all other simulated scenarios.11 
The baseline scenario predicts the emergence of a network-based trading 
pattern with a dominant leading family in the majority of cases. With an 
average of 0.58 the network density is quite high and mostly due to the single 
leading network (99 per cent), which indicates a high degree of network 
organisation among merchants. Furthermore, this leading role of one family 
network remains quite unchallenged over the course of time: the leading 
merchants’ network of period 400 will be in the same position in 89 per cent of 
the cases in period 600 as well. Networks are formed considerably early: in the 
median case, a family network of (at least) five merchants can be observed for 
the first time in period 72. The map shown in Figure 2 represents a typical 
outcome of the simulation model after 600 periods. 
Figure 2:  Baseline Scenario 
 
Plot of grid occupation by merchants in the final period (t = 600) for the baseline scenario. 
Merchants (circles) labeled with a 1 belong to the leading family network. Brighter fields 
correspond to a larger population size of the respective town. 
                                                             
11 Of course, the mean may not necessarily reflect the “typical” outcome if the underlying 
distribution is not unimodal. For a 95 per cent confidence interval of the mean indicators 
within the baseline scenario see Ewert and Sunder (2012). 
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Table 1:  Simulation Results for the Baseline Scenario and Alternative 
Scenarios 
 Baseline scenario 
Random 
mapping 
Absence of 
trade 
privileges 
Absence of 
information 
asymmetry 
STRUCTURE OF TRADING SYSTEM     
network density 0.58 +10 % –60 % –2 % 
dominance of largest network 0.99 –4 % –29 % –1 % 
persistence of leadership 0.89 +5 % –59 % –2 % 
median period of first occurrence 
of a family network with ≥5  
merchants 
72* 30* 113* 69* 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT     
number of merchants 42.5 +15 % +2 % –1 % 
share of ships sailing 0.60 +28 % +17 % –1 % 
number of merchants in food 
towns 
17.02 +28 % +11 % –3 % 
WELFARE     
wealth of leading  
network 
50142 +22 % –44 % –2 % 
 
 
Baseline  
scenario, 
lower costs of 
transportation 
Baseline scenario,
lower cost of 
transportation 
for newcomers 
after t = 400 
Absence of trade 
privileges, 
lower costs of 
transportation 
for newcomers 
after t = 400 
STRUCTURE OF TRADING SYSTEM    
network density –7 % –4 % –67 % 
dominance of largest network –5 % –1 % –36 % 
persistence of leadership –8 % –5 % –73 % 
median period of first occurrence 
of a family network with ≥5 
merchants 
64* 75* 112* 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT    
number of merchants +6 % –1 % +11 % 
share of ships sailing +19 % –1 % +42 % 
number of merchants in food 
towns 
+5 % –3 % +24 % 
WELFARE    
wealth of leading network +1 % –4 % –42 % 
Mean values of 250 replications of each scenario. For scenarios other than the baseline scenar-
io percentage deviations from the mean values of the baseline scenario are given.  
* This value is the median period (rather than a percentage change) and does not correspond 
to t = 600. 
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Simulation results of the baseline scenario match quite well some of the major 
characteristics of demographic and economic dynamics observed for medieval 
Northern Europe. Both political integration of the Baltic regions and conver-
sion to Christianity of the Slavic people were important prerequisites to the 
economic development of the once sparsely populated coastal areas and their 
hinterland. Numerous villages and towns then were founded along the Baltic 
coast between Lübeck and Reval/Tallinn until the late thirteenth century. For 
migrants of the more densely populated areas in Western Europe, new settle-
ments in the Baltic revealed much better economic conditions and offered them 
the opportunity to begin a new life. More importantly, along with the founda-
tion of Lübeck in 1143/1158 AD, the Western European concept of making the 
classic medieval town a law-protected permanent market was transferred to the 
Baltic region. Based on this concept, within only a century all important Hanse 
towns along or near the southern Baltic shore either were founded or received 
municipal law.12 
By 1300 AD however, migration from the West into the Baltic region was 
almost completed, whereas the economic expansion of these newly founded 
towns and their hinterland was already under way. Exactly in this early stage of 
the history of the Hanse, and presumably also because of these developments, 
Northern Europe saw an unprecedented economic take-off. Hence, how does an 
emerging network structure affect economic development and welfare? In the 
final period of the simulation there are 42 merchants on average, i.e. two thirds 
of all towns have a merchant. Since, on average, 17 of them occupy food towns 
on the grid (i.e. about half of the 32 possible towns), expansion to the agricul-
tural regions does occur to a considerable degree in the baseline scenario. On 
average, 60 per cent of all ships, most of which belong to the leading family 
network, actually are sailing in period t = 600. Thus, long-distance maritime 
trade is quite important in the baseline scenario. The welfare measure of the 
model can hardly be interpreted in absolute terms, but what can be seen is an 
increase in the early stages of a simulation run and a persistence of this level 
thereafter. Such a pattern of development is totally in line with the qualitative 
historical evidence for the economic development of the Baltic region from the 
twelfth to fifteenth centuries (Ewert and Sunder 2012). 
3.3   The Formative Role of Geography 
To measure the impact of the clear-cut division of the grid into western 
commercial and eastern agricultural regions on simulation results, a variant of 
the baseline scenario is tested, with a randomised distribution of resources and 
                                                             
12 For example Riga (1201 AD), Rostock (1218 AD), Danzig/Gdańsk (1224 AD), Wismar (1229 
AD), Stralsund (1234 AD), Elbing/Elbląg (1237 AD), Stettin/Szczecin (1243 AD), Greifswald 
(1250 AD), and Königsberg/Kaliningrad (1255 AD) (Hammel-Kiesow 2000). 
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production opportunities at the outset of each replication. Concerning the 
structure of the emerging network of trade, simulation runs of this alternative 
scenario on average produce again a network-based trading pattern, but in this 
system the evolving family network is more densely structured, more 
persistent, it attracts more population to its towns and it is also formed 
considerably earlier than in the baseline scenario – the formation of a first 
network of five merchants on average occurs as early as in period t = 30. This 
notwithstanding, a situation of two (or more) distinct groups of merchants 
having divided the market proves to be more likely with this random map 
layout, as on average the dominance of the largest network is by about 4 per 
cent lower than in the baseline scenario. Figure 3 depicts an outcome of the 
market division by two merchant families. 
Figure 3:  Scenario with a Random Map Layout 
 
Plot of grid occupation by merchants in period t = 600 with an initial random spatial distribution 
of production specialisation, showing a balanced trading network with two family networks. 
 
Economic performance within such a random spatial distribution of production 
specialisation is much better than within the baseline scenario. Overall trade is 
more developed, long-distance trade becomes more important and there is a 
more pronounced expansion of merchants to the agricultural spots on the grid. 
Because of the randomised distribution, regions with a different production 
specialisation are more likely to be located next to each other. This renders the 
emergence of dominant trading centres less likely, to the effect that the 
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population is more evenly distributed across towns. This in turn is an indication 
of a more balanced spread of commercial activities and economic development. 
Global welfare is considerably higher in this scenario, and so is the income of 
merchants as a result of an (on average) shorter distance to market and hence 
lower transportation costs. 
The significant difference between the random spatial distribution scenario 
and the baseline case highlights the importance of geography also in the 
historical course of events, as regional specialisation in fact did differ and 
might have been crucial for the formation of the Hanse’s trading network. 
Moreover, shorter distances to markets would even have allowed market 
integration through other means of transportation than the rather costly 
maritime trade considered in the model. Given the vast spatial extent of 
Northern Europe, one may better understand why it took more than one 
generation to build a kinship network for trade purposes. Huge distances had to 
be bridged, which would have been a much more difficult task without a 
network. That increasing distances nonetheless slowed down the formation of 
kinship networks corresponds with the fact that the Hansards, before they 
attempted to obtain themselves exclusive trade privileges, cooperated with 
other merchants to benefit from the trade privileges that had been granted to 
these merchants. This was a strategy necessary to enter the market at first. 
3.4   The Significant Impact of Trade Privileges 
Following Douglass C. North, institutions as well as formal and informal rules 
of a society are important to economic growth – in either fostering or even 
inhibiting it (North 1981, 1991). Medieval trade privileges may be regarded as 
such institutions. On the one hand they provided incentives for local merchants 
to trade, but on the other hand they could also have growth-inhibiting effects by 
restricting free exchange. Trade privileges could encompass the exclusive 
rights to trade specific products and commodities, to pay a lower market tax or 
a lower toll for shipping goods. Rulers assigned these kinds of rights to single 
merchants or to groups of traders in order to attract trade to their realm. Mer-
chants, as the bearers of such privileges, then usually formed groups, because 
they sought to prevent the rulers from cancelling or abusing these rights (Greif, 
Milgrom and Weingast 1994; Streb 2004). An obvious question is thus, how 
trade would have developed if a certain group of merchants had not been given 
a competitive advantage over others. 
In the considered agent-based model, the institution of trade privileges is 
represented by a port fee merchants have to pay at markets that do not belong 
to their own family network. The results of a scenario without such port fees 
(for any merchant) underline what economic reasoning would suggest. Network 
formation is much less pronounced than in the presence of such privileges. 
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Simulation results underline that the assignment of extensive trade privileges to 
a group of merchants was indeed beneficial to this group, insofar as such privi-
leges restricted trade by outsiders. As a consequence, the group could act as a 
cartel and develop a strong market position. This result strengthens a common 
explanation of the rise of Hanseatic trade during the high Middle Ages as being 
first of all the result of valuable trade privileges having been granted to the 
Hansards at important markets in Northern Europe (Sprandel 1984; Hammel-
Kiesow 2000). 
In contrast, the lack of trade privileges can also be beneficial for the devel-
opment of trade. Although the aggregated volume of trade increases only 
slightly above the baseline level, long-distance trade becomes much more 
important, and more of the agricultural spots become integrated into commer-
cial exchange. Even though this free trade setting provides strong incentives to 
both development and expansion of commercial exchange,13 it has only a mar-
ginal effect on the overall welfare of the population. That profits of merchants 
under free trade conditions are lower than with restricted access to market may 
be rationalised by a more competitive environment. 
3.5   The Coordinating Effect of Information 
In the Middle Ages information could be transmitted only slowly. Within the 
framework of the model, it is possible to analyse if the reliance on kinship-
based networks of trade could have helped medieval merchants to handle the 
information that was relevant to their commercial purposes more efficiently. 
In the model, an information asymmetry exists between members of a kin-
ship network (“insiders”) and non-members (“outsiders”). Being part of a fami-
ly network would give an advantage with respect to price information over 
those not belonging to that network. Therefore, the baseline scenario is com-
pared to a scenario in which such information asymmetries between members 
of a network and non-members do not exist. Simulation results for the latter 
scenario show that a quite similar network pattern of trade evolves, with net-
work density, dominance and persistence being only slightly lower. Concerning 
economic development and welfare, no significant differences to the results of 
the baseline scenario are observed. At first glance, this seems to be a paradoxi-
cal outcome. However, it may be explained by the extensive use of trade privi-
leges under which processing information on those towns not belonging to 
one’s own family network may have seemed pointless to the agents. Although 
                                                             
13 This at least is argued in the economics literature, where pre-modern limited access or 
exclusive orders (as opposed to modern open access or inclusive orders) of commercial ex-
change are held responsible for the retarded medieval and early-modern economic devel-
opment and low growth rates (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012). 
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network formation is usually considered an efficient method to deal with costly 
information, this advantage will not turn out directly in this particular setting, 
where higher gains can always be made from commercial exchange with fami-
ly members. 
This notwithstanding, trade privileges in general reduced the cost of gather-
ing and processing information and thus fostered both the establishment and 
tightening of kinship networks for trade. Close kinship bonds were viable 
means to solve the obvious information and coordination problem that cartels 
usually face. This in turn helped the Hansards also to maintain their trade mo-
nopoly. Cost efficiency of a kinship-based network organisation was thus not 
the only reason for them to stick to this kind of trading pattern in the late Mid-
dle Ages (Ewert and Selzer 2007, 2010). It rather seems likely that forming an 
effective cartel was a crucial motif for their choice of a kinship-based organisa-
tion very early on. And it may also explain why early Hanseatic merchants 
soon abandoned their cooperations with other groups of merchants, e.g. with 
traders from the Isle of Gotland (Hammel-Kiesow 2000). 
3.6   The Meaning of Transportation Costs 
One of the most prominent conclusions of Douglass C. North concerning the 
“Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages” is that the commercial rise of 
medieval Europe was mainly caused by a significant decrease in transaction 
costs, whereas the so-called “Industrial Revolution” of the nineteenth century is 
assumed to have been fostered mainly by rapidly decreasing production costs 
(North 1981, 1985). Transportation costs are a large part of transaction costs, if 
one considers medieval transportation technology and the huge distances the 
Hansards had to bridge. 
To measure the impact of transportation costs a scenario is run in which 
transportation costs are reduced to the half of their original value. A compari-
son of the results of this scenario with those obtained from the baseline scenar-
io confirms how important costs of transportation were for the emergence of 
trade, for its pattern and development, and for welfare as well. Again, a net-
work-based exchange structure emerges, but this network is less densely struc-
tured, less persistent and less dominant. More importantly, a reduction of trans-
portation costs would significantly promote trade development and also 
increase profit opportunities for merchants. However, due to a higher degree of 
competition in such a setting the monopoly rent merchants could extract from 
consumers would not be much higher than in conditions of higher transporta-
tion costs. The overall welfare level of the population would be higher indeed, 
but only by about 2 per cent. 
It can also be tested what would happen if only new groups of merchants 
(“newcomers”) would profit from lower transportation costs. This scenario 
models a technological shift that is only available to those entering the market 
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after a certain time period (t = 400). In the Hanse case this setting became 
reality, when in the late fifteenth century Dutch merchants were able to chal-
lenge the Hansards’ monopoly of wheat trade in the Baltic, simply because 
they were in possession of bigger ships that could carry wheat at lower costs. 
The emerging pattern of trade in this scenario would also be less network-
based, but with smaller deviations from the baseline scenario than before. Fur-
thermore, trade would grow by a lesser amount, and both merchants’ profits 
and global welfare would be more or less on the same level as in the baseline 
scenario. This is again an indication of the competition-preventing effect of a 
kinship-based trading structure in the presence of trade privileges. As such a 
pattern usually emerges quite early after the initialisation of the model (see 
Figure 6), it usually cannot be broken up by a later decrease of transportation 
costs. The persistence of the leading network even though it is technologically 
backward thus points to a lock-in situation. 
Figure 6:  Emergence of the Leading Network after a Technology Shift 
With Trade Privileges Without Trade Privileges 
Histograms of the period of emergence of the leading family network of the final period in 
scenarios with a shift in technology (lower transportation costs for newcomers after period t = 
400), according to the existence of trade privileges. Transportation costs are reduced by 50 per 
cent for newcomer families only. Calculations are based on 250 replications of each scenario. 
 
Another indication of path-dependency is provided by a scenario in which trade 
privileges are lacking. In this case a decrease of transportation costs for later 
newcomers yields a much less pronounced network-based trading system, with 
network density decreasing by about 67 per cent on average. More importantly, 
the persistence of the leading family network would be much lower in compari-
son to the baseline case of the previously discussed scenario in which trade 
privileges existed. The finally leading family network often belongs to the 
newcomer group, i.e. it emerged after the technological shift in period t = 400 
(see Figure 6). In such a setting economic development would improve sub-
stantially, with an increase in the number of merchants by 11 per cent. In par-
ticular, the number of merchants in “the East” would rise by 24 per cent. Long-
distance trade would gain in importance, and welfare would be slightly higher. 
In addition, long-distance traders could make larger profits in such a setting, 
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whereas – due to stronger competition – the opportunity to earn a monopoly 
rent would be lower. 
These results foster the aforementioned interpretation that trade privileges 
were the key vehicle to form closed networks, which cannot easily be broken 
up once established. Much of the literature sees transportation costs at the core 
of the commercial success of the early Hansards. Verly early on, they used 
larger ships (the Kogge), which reduced unit costs of transportation. There is 
also historical evidence confirming that both trade privileges and transportation 
costs were linked to a certain degree. In this way the Hansards were able to 
squeeze Flemish traders out of the emerging Baltic markets (Hammel-Kiesow 
2000). For the Flemish the profitable opportunity to take eastern goods back to 
the West when they traded on these eastern markets was deterred by the mer-
chants of the Hanse. As the bearers of the exclusive right to ship and trade 
goods from the East, Hanseatic merchants profited from decreasing costs per 
voyage in comparison to their competitors when trading on western markets, 
because their ships could be loaded with cargo on both trips of a voyage. The 
various scenarios in which transportation costs are reduced show that this kind 
of technological shift can yield results quite different from those of the baseline 
scenario, but only in the absence of trade privileges. For this reason it makes 
sense that Hanseatic merchants – even in the late Middle Ages – were so keen 
on keeping their extensive trade privileges, e.g. in Bruges, even though other 
markets, especially Antwerp, had developed in the meantime and began seri-
ously to compete with the economic leadership of the Bruges market towards 
the end of the fifteenth century (Selzer 2010). Up to this time, Hanseatic mer-
chants also did not have to worry about new technologies opening up to poten-
tial competitors inasmuch as their fully established trading network was stable 
enough for them to dominate trade even if they may have faced higher trans-
portation costs than some of their competitors. 
4.  Does Agent-Based Simulation Help to Understand the 
Emergence of Medieval Maritime Trade Systems? 
4.1   Insights from Simulation Regarding the Hanse Case 
First of all, simulation runs of the considered agent-based model of maritime 
trade show that modelling and simulation helps to explain the formation of the 
Hanse’s network-based system of long-distance trade and its persistence for 
quite a long time, and to understand why it finally began to erode at the turn of 
the sixteenth century. It seems though as if these developments were a logical 
and necessary result of the environmental conditions of medieval long-distance 
trade. 
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Although some basic features of medieval maritime trade are incorporated, 
other details are nevertheless missing from this model. A way of tailoring the 
model better to the Hanse example would be to implement a certain number of 
trading centres as key markets, which would then play an important role in 
long-distance trade from the very beginning, instead of letting such “hot spots” 
of trade emerge by the simulation itself. Such a setting would model the Han-
seatic case more accurately, as the leading markets of medieval Northern Eu-
rope were the places where Hanseatic merchants could obtain extended trade 
privileges, which in turn became the basis of their kinship-based trading sys-
tem. It is also possible to extend the town grid to more than the 64 locations of 
the present version, thus providing space for more merchants. Efficient cooper-
ation in closed and dense networks is usually limited to a certain number of 
members. Once this critical mass is exceeded, a network’s properties of both 
efficient coordination and enforcement of fairness among members will disap-
pear, because costs for coordination will rise exponentially and a fraud will be 
less likely detected.14 One hypothesis is thus that with a wider grid (i.e. in a 
larger world) it is more likely to observe the emergence of network-based trad-
ing patterns that consist of different family groups of merchants. 
While the model is not primarily designed to explain economic growth and 
the development of the standard of living in Northern Europe in the Middle 
Ages at large, it nevertheless allows to draw some tentative conclusions on the 
contribution a trade cartel like that of the Hansards made to the economic de-
velopment in the Baltic in late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Was the quasi-
monopoly of Hanseatic merchants a necessary prerequisite for triggering a 
“Commercial Revolution” in this region? This is an important question, even 
more so, because the persistence of this cartel that restricted competition was 
partly guaranteed by its kinship-based internal structure. Would Northern Eu-
rope have experienced its commercial expansion and economic boom of the 
high Middle Ages also on the grounds of a different and perhaps more competi-
tive trading system? 
In the baseline scenario the economy develops to an advanced degree, in the 
sense that long-distance trade becomes more important and expands signifi-
cantly into the less developed, agricultural regions. Welfare increases consider-
ably at the time when the network is established, though it does not increase 
much further afterwards. This finding matches quite well the qualitative histor-
ical record. As described above, many towns were founded in this region and 
trade improved significantly. It stands to reason that towns must have been rich 
if large cathedrals could be built there. 
What cannot be proven with archival evidence is how rapid the economic 
take-off was in the Baltic and to which degree the economy of Northern Europe 
                                                             
14 See on this in general Greif (1998; 2000; 2002a), and for the Hanse Ewert and Selzer (2007). 
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had actually grown. Comparing the baseline scenario of our simulation with the 
scenario of a randomly assigned specialisation of towns – in which network 
formation occurred much faster – it may become clearer why the process of 
economic development of the Baltic region in twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
took a century’s time, and why this economic take-off, even though being quite 
impressive, presumably did not match the economic development of Western 
Europe or that of the Mediterranean. A clear-cut division of resources and 
production facilities combined with huge distances, as it was the case for medi-
eval Northern Europe, was obviously a severe obstacle to the development of 
long-distance trade. In the simulation, network-based trade tends to be more 
pronounced in the vicinity of the border between commercial and agricultural 
regions as a result of distance-based transportation costs. This in turn highlights 
why Northern Germany and the town of Lübeck – by occupying this position 
“in between” areas of different economic development – were so important for 
the emergence of the Hanse. 
4.2 Potential Reasons for the Institutional Divergence within 
European Medieval Trade 
The institutional arrangement of maritime long-distance trade in the Mediterra-
nean had developed about a century earlier than the Hanse’s system of net-
work-based trade in the Baltic. To be correct, in the Mediterranean case one 
would have to speak of an already existing system of trade that became more 
and more dominated by Christian merchants, most of them of Italian origin. In 
the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, as a concomitant of the crusades, 
merchants from Italian port cities such as Venice, Genoa, and Pisa took over 
much of the already existing exchange of commodities between Southern Eu-
rope on the one hand and Palestine, the Arab peninsula, and North Africa on 
the other hand. Subsequently, and fairly rapidly, they could restructure trade in 
the Mediterranean on the basis of exclusive trade privileges granted by the 
Byzantine Empire and the newly founded Crusader States in Palestine. 
Compared with the Hanse’s network organisation of trade in Northern Eu-
rope, the pattern of maritime long-distance trade in the Mediterranean was 
different in many respects. Of course, kinship and personal bonds were im-
portant among merchants in the Mediterranean, too, but overall quite early 
trade was characterised much more by law-based institutions and third-party 
enforcement than by self-enforcing institutions. Italian merchants made proper 
use of formal contracts like the societas maris, commenda, or collegantia, 
which allowed them to raise funds for their risky overseas commercial endeav-
ours and to spread commercial risk across the partners involved in such a trade. 
Later on, Italian merchants were also the first to form larger trade companies, 
and as merchant bankers they developed a far stretched banking system 
through which trading partners – with the help of bills of exchange – could 
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transfer money all across Europe and pay cashless for their obligations. Formal 
contracts could be credibly enforced because of the responsibility of Italian 
town communities for commercial affairs and because contracts usually were 
certified by a notary public (Greif 2000a, 2002b). So, why was there a signifi-
cant divergence of institutional development of medieval maritime long-
distance trade between the Baltic and the Mediterranean? 
Even though the agent-based model of medieval trade presented in this pa-
per was designed to mainly match the Hanse case, simulation results nonethe-
less may help to understand a little better why the institutional arrangement of 
maritime long-distance trade in the Mediterranean developed so differently. At 
least some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the findings obtained in the 
analysis of trade in Northern Europe. 
One result for the Hanse case was that a clear-cut division of geographic 
specialisation slows down both network formation and economic development. 
Such a pronounced spread of resources cannot be found in the Mediterranean 
around 1100 AD. And compared to Northern Europe there were not such pro-
nounced differences in economic development, either. Italian merchants ac-
cessed already well-developed markets when they entered the eastern Mediter-
ranean in the early twelfth century. And they were soon backed by trade 
privileges for their trade in the Byzantine Empire and in the newly founded 
Crusader States in Palestine. Moreover, as a heritage of the Roman Empire in 
classical antiquity the whole region was still characterised by the Roman law, 
irrespective of the religion of merchants. Since also Muslim as well as Jewish 
traders were well acquainted with formal contracting along the lines of Roman 
law, there was not much of a juridical differential. On the contrary, the more or 
less diffuse knowledge of Roman law in the Mediterranean may very well point 
also to a path-dependent development that favoured choosing formal contract-
ing for trade.  
The much smaller geographic differential in economic development likely 
had positive repercussions on trade in general. And this may explain why in the 
Mediterranean more complex and more formal institutions of trade emerged 
much earlier. In transaction cost theory economies of scale are assumed to be 
an important factor in the organisation of commercial exchange. The bigger 
amount of population that lived along the shores of the Mediterranean and its 
hinterland naturally generated a much bigger volume of trade. This might have 
thus called for a more formal structure of exchange and for formal solutions of 
enforcement as well. Exactly these necessary economies of scale in the organi-
sation of trade were realised, because the amount of traded commodities had 
very early on exceeded a threshold below which a formal institutional ar-
rangement would have been too costly. With bigger volumes traded also more 
capital could be accumulated, which then was reinvested in even bigger com-
mercial endeavours. 
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Finally, a further potential reason would stem from the differences in trade 
privileges and market organisation. On the ground of their exclusive trade 
privileges, Hanseatic merchants formed a stable cartel through which they were 
able to monopolise trade in the Baltic. A similar behaviour of Italian merchants 
in the Mediterranean cannot be observed. Merchants from different Italian 
towns did not share privileges as Hanseatic merchants did. Instead the Italian 
merchants always competed for trade privileges, and in the long run this com-
petition was settled by a de facto division of markets with Venetian merchants 
predominantly trading in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea and 
Genoese merchants mainly operating in the western Mediterranean. It goes 
without saying that this sort of competition provoked attempts of the authorities 
of Italian port cities to provide their merchants with formal institutions, because 
the town communities always had strong interests in backing their compatriots 
within this commercial competition. 
4.3   Why Use Simulation in Historical Research? 
Modelling and simulation are definitely not among the standard techniques that 
are usually used in historical research, especially not in the field of medieval 
history. Agent-based simulation, for instance, has previously been applied in 
demographical research, sociology, and economics (Doran 1996; Epstein and 
Axtell 1996; Epstein 1999; LeBaron 2000; Billari and Prskawetz 2003), but 
rarely in historical research.15 How can this reluctance of historians to make use 
of such a powerful tool be explained? Historians typically have strong reserva-
tions concerning the use of formal models, because they doubt that a complex 
historical reality could be captured within a simple abstract model. Of course, a 
simulation model cannot – and probably should not – cover all aspects and 
details of a historical phenomenon. It should be restricted to key parameters, in 
order to obtain general insights into structure and dynamics, but choosing what 
is relevant and what can be ignored is certainly a difficult task. However, for 
quite a while now the use of formal models and quantitative methods to test 
these models empirically has been adopted by scholars in at least particular 
fields of historical research like economic history, for instance. The so-called 
“New Economic History” began to flourish in the early 1960s, and this scien-
tific paradigm is built upon the explicit use of economic theory to explain the 
phenomena of the past, the formulation of (causal) hypotheses and the test of 
these hypotheses with historical data (Sarrazin 1974; 1980). So, from this side, 
                                                             
15 Cf. Ewert (2007) for some more general considerations concerning the issue and Ewert, 
Roehl and Uhrmacher (2003; 2007) for an application to long-term demographic and eco-
nomic consequences of mortality crises in pre-modern urban communities and the assess-
ment of strategies and devices to manage such crises. 
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there should not be any real problem in using a modelling approach even for 
the analysis of medieval phenomena. 
Hence, modelling in general and quantification in particular appear not to be 
the major objectives in using simulation in the context of historical research. 
The major problem of a methodological transfer is that historians and social 
scientists (including the economists) are looking at historical events and pro-
cesses in a completely different way. Whereas social scientists usually are 
interested in deriving common patterns and certain determinants of develop-
ment, historians always point to the fact that history by definition is unique, 
and therefore historical events and processes cannot be explained on the 
grounds of any ahistorical abstract model. And in fact, they are absolutely right 
in doing so, because the singularity of past events and processes cannot be 
denied, of course. As a consequence, it is straightforward to say that history 
always happens only once and can thus not be repeated. This notwithstanding, 
repeating history is not what simulation approaches are really aiming at. Simu-
lation adds to the possibilities of analysis on the basis of formal models. When-
ever formal analysis is an appropriate approach to history, simulation should 
also be acknowledged as an acceptable and viable technique. Therefore there 
are good reasons why resorting to simulation methods in historical research 
may be very well justified. Simulation allows scientists to construct alternative 
scenarios to what has been observed in reality, scenarios which could have 
happened in the past as well. And such “what-if-scenarios” are useful to put 
known historical facts into a well-defined context (Fogel 1970; Sarrazin 1980; 
Ewert 2007). Simulation is thus not an alternative means to historical interpre-
tation. It is, in contrast, a method to foster interpretation, especially if empirical 
data are scant or almost completely missing, as is the case with the early mari-
time long-distance trade in medieval Europe. 
References 
Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business. 
Asmussen, Georg. 2002. Die Älterleute der Lübecker Bergenfahrer (1401-1854). 
Eine Führungsposition in Lübeck im Vergleich über mehrere Jahrhunderte. In 
Menschenbilder – Menschenbildner. Individuum und Gruppe im Blick des 
Historikers (Hallische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Frühen 
Neuzeit 2), ed. Stephan Selzer and Ulf Christian Ewert, 121-52. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag. 
Bautier, Robert-Henri. 1953. Les foires de Champagne. Recherches sur une évo-
lution historique. Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin 5: 97-147. 
Berlow, Rosalind K. 1971. The Development of Business Techniques Used at the 
Fairs of Champagne From the End of the Twelfth to the Middle of the Thirteenth 
Century. Studies in medieval and Renaissance history 8: 3-32. 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  138 
Billari, Francesco, and Alexia Prskawetz, eds. 2003. Agent-based Computational 
Demography. Using Simulation to Improve Our Understanding of Demographic 
Behaviour. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. 
Bracker, Jörg. 1989. Die Hanse. Lebenswirklichkeit und Mythos. Katolog der 
Ausstellung im Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte 1989, vol. 2. Lübeck: 
Schmidt-Römhild [2006]. 
Burkhardt, Mike. 2009. Der Bergenhandel im Spätmittelalter: Handel, Kaufleute, 
Netzwerke (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte 60). Cologne, 
Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau. 
Burkhardt, Mike. 2012. Kaufmannsnetzwerke und Handelskultur. Zur Verbindung 
von interpersonellen Beziehungsgeflechten und kaufmännischem Habitus im 
spätmittelalterlichen Ostseeraum. In Raumbildung durch Netzwerke? Der 
Ostseeraum zwischen Wikingerzeit und Spätmittelalter aus archäologischer und 
geschichtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive, ed. Sunhild Kleingärtner and Gabriel 
Zeilinger. Zeitschrift für Archäologie des Mittelalters Beiheft 23: 117-30. Bonn: 
Habelt. 
Cordes, Albrecht. 1998. Spätmittelalterlicher Gesellschaftshandel im Hanseraum 
(Quellen und Darstellungen zur hansischen Geschichte N.F. 45). Cologne: Böhlau. 
Cordes, Albrecht. 1999. Einheimische und gemeinrechtliche Elemente im 
hansischen Gesellschaftsrecht des 15.-17. Jahrhunderts. Eine Projektskizze. In 
kopet uns werk by tyden. Beiträge zur hansischen und preußischen Geschichte. 
Festschrift für Walter Stark zum 75. Geburtstag, ed. Nils Jörn, Detlef Kattinger 
and Horst Wernicke, 67-71. Schwerin: Helms. 
Cordes, Albrecht. 2000. Wie verdiente der Kaufmann sein Geld? Hansische 
Handelsgesellschaften im Spätmittelalter (Handel, Geld und Politik vom frühen 
Mittelalter bis heute 2). Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild. 
Dollinger, Philippe. 1964. La Hanse (XIIe-XVIIe siècles). Paris: Aubier. 
Doran, Jim E. 1996. From Computer Simulation to Artificial Societies. 
Transactions of the Society for Computer Simulation International 14 (2): 69-77. 
Dünnebeil, Sonja. 1996. Die Lübecker Zirkel-Gesellschaft. Formen der 
Selbstdarstellung einer städtischen Oberschicht (Veröffentlichungen zur 
Geschichte der Hansestadt Lübeck B27). Lübeck: Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck. 
Edwards, Jeremy, Sheilagh C. Ogilvie. 2011. Contract Enforcement, Institutions, 
and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised.  Economic History 
Review 64: 1-24. 
Edwards, Jeremy, and Sheilagh C. Ogilvie. 2012. What Lessons for Economic 
Development Can We Draw from the Champagne Fairs? Explorations in 
Economic History 49: 131-48. 
Epstein, Joshua M. 1999. Agent-Based Computational Models and Generative 
Social Science. Complexity 4/5: 41-60. 
Epstein, Joshua M., and Robert Axtell. 1996. Growing Artificial Societies. Social 
Science from the Bottom Up. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Epstein, Steven A. 2009. An Economic and Social History of Later Medieval 
Europe, 1000-1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian. 2007. Wirtschaftsgeschichte im Experiment: Modellierung 
und Simulation als Methode zur Erforschung ökonomischer Folgen vormoderner 
Sterblichkeitskrisen. Working Paper, Chemnitz University of Technology. 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  139 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, Mathias Roehl, and Adelinde M. Uhrmacher. 2003. 
Consequences of Mortality Crises in Pre-modern European Towns: A 
Multiagent-based Simulation Approach. In Agent-based Computational 
Demography. Using Simulation to Improve Our Understanding of Demographic 
Behaviour, ed. Francesco Billari and Alexia Prskawetz, 175-96. Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, Mathias Roehl, and Adelinde M. Uhrmacher. 2007. Hunger 
and Market Dynamics in Pre-modern Communities: Insights into the Effects of 
Market Intervention from a Multi-agent Model. Historical Social Research 32 
(4): 122-50. doi: 10.12759/hsr.32.2007.4.122-150.  
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Stephan Selzer. 2007. Netzwerkorganisation im 
Fernhandel des Mittelalters. Wettbewerbsvorteil oder Wachstumshemmnis? In 
Unternehmerische Netzwerke. Eine historische Organisationsform mit Zukunft? 
ed. Hartmut Berghoff and Jörg Sydow, 45-70. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Stephan Selzer. 2010. Wirtschaftliche Stärke durch 
Vernetzung. Zu den Erfolgsfaktoren des hansischen Handels. In Praktiken des 
Handels. Geschäfte und soziale Beziehungen europäischer Kaufleute in 
Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit, ed. Mark Häberlein and Christof Jeggle, 39-69. 
(Irseer Schriften N.F. 6). Konstanz: UVK. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Stephan Selzer. 2015. Social Networks. In A Companion 
to the Hanseatic League (Brill’s Companions to European History 8), ed. Donald 
J. Harreld Leiden, 162-93. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Stephan Selzer. 2016. Institutions of Hanseatic Trade: 
Studies on the Political Economy of a Medieval Network Organisation. Frankfurt 
a. M.: Peter Lang. 
Ewert, Ulf Christian, and Marco Sunder. 2012. Trading Networks, Monopoly, and 
Economic Development in Medieval Northern Europe: An Agent-based 
Simulation of Early Hanseatic Trade. In Raumbildung durch Netzwerke? Der 
Ostseeraum zwischen Wikingerzeit und Spätmittelalter aus archäologischer und 
geschichtswissenschaftlicher Perspektive (Zeitschrift für Archäologie des 
Mittelalters Beiheft 23), ed. Sunhild Kleingärtner and Gabriel Zeilinger, 131-53. 
Bonn: Habelt. 
Fogel, Robert W. 1970 Historiography and Retrospective Econometrics. History 
and Theory 9: 245-64. 
Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1996. The “New Network Analysis” and its Application to 
Organizational Theory and Behavior. In Networks in Marketing, ed. Dawn 
Iacobucci, 19-31. Thousand Oakes, CA, London, New Delhi: Sage. 
Greif, Avner. 1989. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders. Journal of Economic History 49: 857-82. 
Greif, Avner. 1992. Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the 
Commercial Revolution. American Economic Review 82: 128-33. 
Greif, Avner. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early 
Trade: The Magribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review 83: 525-48. 
Greif, Avner. 1997. Microtheory and Recent Developments in the Study of 
Economic Institutions through Economic History. In Advances in Economics and 
Econometrics: Theory and Applications, vol. 2, ed. David M. Kreps and Kenneth 
F. Wallis, 79-113. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  140 
Greif, Avner. 1993. Théorie des jeux et analyse historique des institutions. Les 
institutions économiques du Moyen Age. Annales HSS 53: 597-633. 
Greif, Avner. 2000a. The Fundamental Problem of Exchange. A Research Agenda 
in Historical Institutional Analysis. European Review of Economic History 4: 
251-84. 
Greif, Avner. 2002a. Economic History and Game Theory. In Handbook of Game 
Theory with Economic Applications (Handbooks in Economics 11), ed. Robert J. 
Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 1989-2024. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Greif, Avner. 2002b. Institutions and Impersonal Exchange. From Communal to 
Individual Responsibility. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
158: 168-204.  
Greif, Avner. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons 
from Medieval Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Coordination, 
Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of 
Political Economy 41: 745-76. 
Greve, Anke. 2002. Fremde unter Freunden – Freunde unter Fremden? Hansische 
Kaufleute im spätmittelalterlichen Brügger Handelsalltag. In Menschenbilder – 
Menschenbildner. Individuum und Gruppe im Blick des Historikers (Hallische 
Beiträge zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit 2), ed. Stephan 
Selzer and Ulf Christian Ewert, 177-88. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Hammel, Rolf. 2000. Hauseigentum im spätmittelalterlichen Lübeck. Methoden zur 
sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Auswertung der Oberstadtbuchregesten. 
Lübecker Schriften zur Archäologie und Kulturgeschichte 10: 85-300. 
Hammel-Kiesow, Rolf. 2000. Die Hanse. Munich: C.H. Beck. 
Igel, Karsten. 2005. Zur Sozialtopographie Greifswalds um 1400. Der Greifswalder 
liber herediatum (1351–1452). In Die Sozialstruktur und Sozialtopographie 
vorindustrieller Städte (Hallische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und 
der Frühen Neuzeit 1), ed. Matthias Meinhardt and Andreas Ranft, 227-45. 
Berlin: Akademie Verlag. 
Illinitch, Anne Y., Richard A. D’Aveni, and Arie Y. Levin. 1996. New 
Organizational Forms and Strategies for Managing in Hypercompetitive 
Environments. Organization Science 7: 211-20. 
Irsigler, Franz. 1985. Der Alltag einer hansischen Kaufmannsfamilie im Spiegel der 
Veckinchusen-Briefe. Hansische Geschichtsblätter 103: 75-99 
Koppe, Wilhelm. 1933. Lübeck-Stockholmer Handelsgeschichte im 14. Jahrhundert 
(Abhandlungen zur Handels- und Seegeschichte 2). Neumünster: Wachholtz. 
Lane, Frederic C. 1963. The Economic Meaning of the Invention of the Compass. 
American Historical Review 68: 605-17. 
LeBaron, Blake. 2000. Agent-based Computational Finance: Suggested Readings 
and Early Research. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24: 679-702. 
Lopez, Robert S. 1971. The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall [Reprint 1976, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press]. 
Meyer, Gunnar. 2002. ... up dat se mynen lesten wyllen truweliken vorvullen. Die 
Werkmeister der Lübecker Pfarrkirchen als Vormünder in Testamenten. In 
Menschenbilder – Menschenbildner. Individuum und Gruppe im Blick des 
Historikers (Hallische Beiträge zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Frühen 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  141 
Neuzeit 2), ed. Stephan Selzer and Ulf Christian Ewert, 277-94. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag.  
Meyer, Gunnar. 2005. Solidarität in der Genossenschaft: Die Lübecker 
Bergenfahrer des frühen 15. Jahrhunderts im Spiegel ihrer Testamente. In Das 
hansische Kontor zu Bergen und die Lübecker Bergenfahrer: International 
Workshop Lübeck 2003, (Veröffentlichungen zur Geschichte der Hansestadt 
Lübeck B41), ed. Antjekathrin Graßmann, 187-204. Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild. 
Meyer, Gunnar. 2010. ‘Besitzende Bürger’ und ‘elende Sieche’. Lübecks 
Gesellschaft im Spiegel ihrer Testamente 1400-1449 (Veröffentlichungen zur 
Geschichte der Hansestadt Lübeck B48). Lübeck: Schmidt-Römhild. 
Mickwitz, Gunnar. 1937. Neues zur Funktion hansischer Handelsgesellschaften. 
Hansische Geschichtsblätter 62: 191-201. 
Mickwitz, Gunnar. 1938. Aus Revaler Handelsbüchern. Zur Technik des 
Ostseehandels in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts (Societas Scientiarum 
Fennica. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum IX/5). Helsingfors: 
Harassowitz. 
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of 
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the 
Champagne Fair. Economics and Politics 2: 1-23. 
Munro, John H. 2001. The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing 
Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. The Textile Trades, 
Warfare, and Transaction Costs. Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 88: 1-47. 
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York, 
London: W.W. Norton & Co. 
North, Douglass C. 1985. Transaction Costs in History. Journal of European 
Economic History 14: 557-76. 
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
North, Douglass C. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 97-112. 
North, Douglass C. 1993. Institutions and Credible Commitment. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 11-23. 
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human 
History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ogilvie, Sheilagh C. 2007. “Whatever is, is right”? Economic Institutions in Pre-
industrial Europe. The Economic History Review 60: 649-84. 
Ogilvie, Sheilagh C., and André W. Carus. 1997. Institutions and Economic Growth 
in Historical Perspective. In Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 2A, ed. 
Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf, 405-514. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Osborn, Richard N., and John Hagedoorn. 1997. The Institutionalisation and 
Evolutionary Dynamics of Inter-organisational Alliances and Networks. Academy 
of Management Journal 40: 261-78. 
Powell, Walter W. 1990. Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organization. Research in Organisational Behaviour 12: 295-336. 
Sarrazin, Thilo. 1974. Ökonomie und Logik der historischen Erklärung. Zur 
Wissenschaftslogik der New Economic History (Schriftenreihe des 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  142 
Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 109). Bonn-Bad Godesberg: 
Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 
Sarrazin, Thilo. 1980. Theorien in der quantifizierenden Geschichtsforschung. In 
Theorien in der Geschichtswissenschaft (Geschichte und Sozialwissenschaften. 
Studientexte zur Lehrerbildung 2), ed. Jörn Rüsen and Hans Süssmuth, 79-97. 
Düsseldorf: Schwann.  
Schönfelder, Alexander. 1988. Handelsmessen und Kreditwirtschaft im 
Hochmittelalter. Die Champagnemessen. Saarbrücken: Dadder. 
Schweichel, Roswitha. 2002. Kaufmännische Kontakte und Warenaustausch 
zwischen Köln und Brügge. Die Handelsgesellschaft von Hildebrand 
Veckinchusen, Werner Scherer und Reinhard Noiltgin. In ... in guete freuntlichen 
nachbarlichen verwantnus und hantierung ... Wanderung von Personen, 
Verbreitung von Ideen, Austausch von Waren in den niederländischen und 
deutschen Küstenregionen vom 13. bis 18. Jahrhundert (Oldenburger Schriften 
zur Geschichtswissenschaft 6), ed. Dick E. H. de Boer et al., 341-58. Oldenburg: 
BIS Carl von Ossietzky-Universität.  
Selzer, Stephan. 1996. Artushöfe im Ostseeraum. Ritterlich-höfische Kultur in den 
Städten des Preußenlandes im 14. Jahrhundert (Kieler Werkstücke D8). 
Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. 
Selzer, Stephan. 2003. Trinkstuben als Orte der Kommunikation. Das Beispiel der 
Artushöfe im Preußenland (ca. 1350–1550). In Geschlechtergesellschaften, 
Zunft-Trinkstuben und Bruderschaften in spätmittelalterlichen und 
frühneuzeitlichen Städten (Stadt in der Geschichte 30), ed. Gerhard Fouquet, 
Matthias Steinbrink and Gabriel Zeilinger, 73-98. Stuttgart: Thorbecke. 
Selzer, Stephan. 2010. Die mittelalterliche Hanse (Geschichte kompakt). 
Darmstadt: WBG. 
Selzer, Stephan, and Ulf Christian Ewert. 2001. Verhandeln und Verkaufen, 
Vernetzen und Vertrauen. Über die Netzwerkstruktur des hansischen Handels. 
Hansische Geschichtsblätter 119: 135-61. 
Selzer, Stephan, and Ulf Christian Ewert. 2005. Die Neue Institutionenökonomik als 
Herausforderung an die Hanseforschung. Hansische Geschichtsblätter 123: 7-29. 
Selzer, Stephan, and Ulf Christian Ewert. 2010. Netzwerke im europäischen Handel 
des Mittelalters: Konzepte – Anwendungen – Fragestellungen. In Netzwerke im 
europäischen Handel des Mittelalters (Vorträge und Forschungen 72), ed. 
Gerhard Fouquet and Hans-Jörg Gilomen, 21-47. Ostfildern: Thorbecke. 
Sprandel, Rolf. 1984. Die Konkurrenzfähigkeit der Hanse im Spätmittelalter. 
Hansische Geschichtsblätter 102: 21-38. 
Staber, Udo. 2000. Steuerung von Unternehmensnetzwerken: Organisations-
theoretische Perspektiven und soziale Mechanismen. In Steuerung von 
Netzwerken. Konzepte und Praktiken, ed. Jörg Sydow and Arnold Windeler, 58-
87. Wiesbaden: Kohlhammer. 
Stark, Walter. 1993. Über Techniken und Organisationsformen des hansischen 
Handels im Spätmittelalter. In Der hansische Sonderweg? Beiträge zur Sozial- 
und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Hanse, ed. Stuart Jenks, Michael North, 191-201. 
Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau. 
Streb, Jochen. 2004. Die politische Glaubwürdigkeit von Regierungen im 
institutionellen Wandel. Warum ausländische Fürsten das Eigentum der 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  143 
Fernhandelskaufleute der Hanse schützten. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 
2004 (1): 141-56. 
Thomas, Heinz. 1977. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Champagne-Messen im 14. 
Jahrhundert. Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 64: 433-67. 
Windeler, Arnold. 2001. Unternehmensnetzwerke. Konstitution und Strukturation. 
Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
von Brandt, Ahasver. 1963. Die Hanse als mittelalterliche Wirtschaftsorganisation. 
Entstehen, Daseinsformen, Aufgaben. In Die Deutsche Hanse als Mittler 
zwischen Ost und West, ed. Ahasver von Brandt, Paul Johansen, Hans van 
Werveke, Kjell Kumlien and Hermann Kellenbenz, 9-38. Cologne, Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Wilensky, Uri. 1999. NetLogo. <http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/> (Accessed 
December 12, 2017). Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based 
Modeling, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 
